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LIMITATIONS OF ACTION-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AS GUIDE FOR DETERMINATION OF LACHES WHERE CONCURRENT REMEDIES ARE AVAILABLE
IN LAW AND EQUITY:-In

1926 Bovay, one of the complaining trustees in
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bankruptcy herein, organized an Arkansas corporation to construct and operate
a vehicular traffic bridge across the Mississippi River. Defendants agreed to
fi_nance the project but were dissatisfied with the voting conti;ol of the Arkansas
corporation lodged in Bovay and organized a Delaware corporation, the bankrupt
herein, to take an assignment of the bridge franchise. The bankrupt issued
60,000 shares of no par value common stock, 40,000 shares going to defendants
though no consideration was paid, and 20,000 shares to Bovay. Defendants
also named five of the nine members of the board of directors. The bankrupt
sold $7,500,000, $100 par value debenture and first mortgage bonds at 90 to
the defendants who already had contracted for their resale at more than par. The
defendants also fleeced the bankrupt of $275,000 for alleged divers expenses in
organizing the Delaware corporation. Though insolvent from its conception
by virtue of the frauds perpetrated by the defendants, the bankrupt operated the
bridge in an incompleted state until 1934 when it was finally adjudicated a bankrupt by a federal court in Mississippi. The trustees in bankruptcy filed a plenary
suit against the defendants for breach of fiduciary trust, but the complaint was
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction in June 1936. For some unknown reason permission to sue in the Delaware courts was not granted until January 1939 when
Plaintiff's complaint was promptly filed. The trial court dismissed the bill on
the ground that since the cause of action was not within the exclusive jurisdiction
of equity, the three years statute of limitations was conclusive of laches. Held,
reversed. Bovay v. H. M. Byllesby & Co., (Del. 1944) 38A. (2d) 808.
Where the law and equity courts have concurrent remedies for the same
cause of action, even though the equitable relief is more desirable, the statute of
limitations ordinarily is employed by chancery to determine conclusively the
presence of laches.1 But where the c;ause of action falls exclusively within the
cognizance of courts of equity, the statute of limitations is not controlling unless
the statute expressly so provides.2 Thus, in the field of trusts, the statute does not
run against express trusts cognizable only in equity, but does bar suits based on
implied trusts, which have counter remedies, in the courts of law. In many states
the statute of limitations applies to all equitable suits as well as legal actions. 8
In those jurisdictions which have abolished the distinction between legal and
equitable forms of actions the statute of limitations is, of course, applicable to all
1
Minion v. Warner, 238 N.Y. 413, 144 N.E. 665, (1924); Hughes v. Brown,
88 Tenn. 578, 13 S.W. 286 (1890); Baker v. Cummings, 169 U.S. 189, 18 S. Ct.
367, (1898); Browne v. Browne, 17 Fla. 607 (1880). See 2 POMEROY, EQUITY JuRisPRUDENCE, 5th ed.,§ 418 (1941).
2
Evansv. Moore, 247 Ill. 60, 93 N.E. 118 (1910); Shelby v. Shelby, 3 Cooke
(Tenn.) 179, (1812); Felsenheld v. Bloch Bros. Tobacco Co., l 19, W. Va. 167,
192 S.E. 545 (1937); Union Bank v. Stafford, 12 How. (U.S.) 327 (1851); But
courts of equity usually hold statute of limitations obligatory upon them where chancery is enforcing merely legal rights; Riddle v. Whitehill, 135 U.S. 621, IO S. Ct. 924
(1890); Phalen v. Clark, 19 Conn. 421 (1849).
8
Boyd v. Blankman, 29 Cal. 19, (1865); Stoneham Five Cents Sav. Bank v. Johnson, 295 Mass. 390, 3 N.E. (2d) 730 (1936); Washington Sav. Bank v, Butchers' &
Drovers Bank, 107 Mo. 133, 17 S.W. 644 (1891); Smith v. Fly, 24 Tex. 345
(1859); Ellis v. Ward, 137 Ill. 509, 25 N.E. 530 (1890).
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suits. 4 In the principal case, the trustees i~ bankruptcy either could have sued at
law in tort or in equity for an accounting on a constructive trust theory. The
defendants strenuously argued that inasmuch as concurrent legal .and equitable
remedies were available for the same cause of action, the court was bound by
the general rule to accept the e:\.'})iration of the 3 years statute of limitations as
conclusive of !aches. And by the great weight of authority, 5 the statute of limitations applies to both actions at law and suits in equity to compel officers, directors, or promoters of a corporation to account for assets misappropriated by
. them or to hold them liable for losses caused by their wrongful or unauthorized
acts. The court in the principal case admitted that where suits are instigated to
recoup losses of the corporation suffered by the passive neglect of duty of its officers or directors, the statute of limitations should be held applicable in order to
afford ample protection to retiring officers and directors. But where they have
unlawfully enriched themselves at the expense of the corporation by their
wrongful acts of commission; ~s distinguished from acts of omission, a different
rule should apply. In such instances, the court argued, equity should not regard
their wrongful acts as mere torts but as breaches of trust of so serious a nature _as
to justify treating the trust as an express trust outside the protection of the statute of
limitations. A like result has been reached in other jurisdictions. 6 The majority
rule is to be criticized in two respects: (a) it affords to corporate officers an ample
opportunity to cover their misfeasances by lapse of time, (b) and by affording
protection to the corporate officers, the public is denied the opportunity of
safely investing in and lending credit to corporate enterprise. The writer submits the minority rule, expressed in the principal case, rests on sounder reasoning.
Craig E. Drwids, (S. Ed.)

4 Patterson v. Hewitt, 195 U.S. 309, 25 S. Ct. 35 (1904); Trail v. Firth, 186
Cal. 68, 198 P. 1033 (1921); Chinn v. Trustees, 32 Ohio St. 236 (1877); Hotchkin v. McNaught-Collins Imp. Co., 102 Wash. 161, 172 P. 864 (1918).
5 Anderson v. Gailey, (D.C. Ga. 1929) 33 F. (2d) 589; Blythe v. Enslen, 203
Ala. 692, 85 S. 1 (1919); Lippitt v. Ashley, 89 Conn. 451, 94 A. 995 (1915);
Landis v. Saxton, 105 Mo. 486, 16 S.W. 912 (1891); Brinckerhoff v. Bostwick, 99
N.Y. 185, 1 N.E. 663 (1885); Wallace v. Lincoln Savings Bank, 89 Tenn. 630,
15 S.W. 448 (1891); Jones Mining Co. v. Cardiff Mining & Milling Co., 56 Utah
449, 191 P. 426 (1920). The statute of limitations does not begin to run until the
wrong doing officer-director has been removed from office; Curtis v. Connly, 257 U.S.
260, 42 S. Ct. 100 (1921); Becker v. Billings, 304111. 190, 136 N.E. 581 (1922).
6 Ellis v. Ward, 137 Ill. 509, 25 N.E. 530 (1890); Williams v. McKay, 40 N.J.
Eq. 189 (1885); Ventressv. Wallace I I I Miss. 357, 71 S. 636 (1916).
In California, a statute imposing liability on corporate promoters, officer-directors
provides that no statute of limitations. shall be a bar to any suit under the statute.

